“Souls Aren’t Saved Just in Church Buildings”: Defining “Religious Exercise” Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act by Brennan, Taylor Luckey








   
  
   
 
 
   






     
  




“SOULS AREN’T SAVED JUST IN CHURCH 
BUILDINGS”: DEFINING “RELIGIOUS 
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ABSTRACT
Throughout its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged the difficulty inherent in determining the scope of
the multivalent term “religion.” The Court has repeatedly struggled to
articulate workable definitions of religion, religious belief, and
religious exercise. And the struggle is ongoing. The Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) protects “religious 
exercise” in the land-use context. If a claimant can prove that its 
religious exercise is substantially burdened by a land ordinance or
zoning regulation, it may receive an exemption. 
Although RLUIPA offers a definition of “religious exercise,” it
remains unclear just what types of land uses and activities are protected 
by the statute’s broad scope. Surely RLUIPA protects formal worship 
uses, such as hosting a mass or offering Sunday School classes, but does
it protect a homeless shelter on church grounds? Residential housing
for synagogue staff? A Christian radio show? 
This Note examines the current framework used to assess religious
land-use claims under RLUIPA, arguing that this analysis not only
leads to inconsistent outcomes but also impermissibly requires judges
to involve themselves too deeply in questions of religious belief. 
Recognizing the danger in having judges act as the arbiters of religious 
belief, this Note proposes an alternative criterion for what uses ought 
to count as religious exercise: sincerity alone. If a land use is considered
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to be a sincere extension of a religious person or entity’s religious belief 
it should qualify as religious exercise. This principle is supported by the 
Court’s own First Amendment jurisprudence and the text and 
legislative history of RLUIPA. 
[T]he Court leaves open the possibility a useful distinction might be 
drawn between laws that discriminate on the basis of religious status and 
religious use. Respectfully, I harbor doubts about the stability of such a
line. Does a religious man say grace before dinner? Or does a man begin
his meal in a religious manner? . . . [The Free Exercise] Clause 
guarantees the free exercise of religion, not just the right to inward belief 
(or status).1 
INTRODUCTION
Hand of Hope Pregnancy Resource Center (“Hand of Hope”), in
Raleigh, North Carolina, is a Christian nonprofit that provides pro-life 
counseling to pregnant women.2 In December 2015, Hand of Hope 
purchased an office location in a residential zone that permits “civic 
uses” of the property but does not permit “medical uses.”3 The 
property is adjacent to an abortion clinic, Preferred Women’s Health 
Center.4 Because Hand of Hope provides limited medical services,
including nondiagnostic ultrasound imaging by licensed physicians, in 
addition to counseling and support services,5 the Raleigh City Council 
determined that Hand of Hope could not operate on its purchased
property under the current zoning scheme.6 It also denied Hand of 
1. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025–26 (2017)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted). Justice Gorsuch wrote to respond to the 
majority’s statement that the case could be distinguished from Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 
(2004), because in Locke, “Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was ; he was
denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the 
ministry. Here . . . Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a church.”
Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (emphasis added). 
2. About Us, HAND OF HOPE PREGNANCY RESOURCE CTR. (2019),
https://www.handofhope.net/about-us/our-center [https://perma.cc/LN29-7RD8] (“We exist 
solely to truly offer women and men who are experiencing an unexpected pregnancy a real choice
in their decision making process.”). 
3. Hand of Hope Pregnancy Res. Ctr. v. City of Raleigh, 332 F. Supp. 3d 983, 988 (E.D.N.C. 
2018).
 4. Id.
 5. About Us, supra note 2 (“We seek to meet a physical need first through the following 
free services: physician-quality pregnancy testing, limited ultrasounds and NC Women’s Right to
Know certification. . . . Life Coach counseling, Life Skills classes and post-abortion support Bible 
studies are also offered free of charge.”).
 6. Hand of Hope, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 989.












   
 
 





   
    
  
   
 
 
    
  
  






       
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1355
Hope’s petition for rezoning and rejected its argument that its services
fall under a permissible “civic use.”7 
Hand of Hope filed suit against the City of Raleigh,8 arguing, inter
alia, that the zoning ordinance imposed a substantial burden on its 
“religious exercise.”9 It contended that even though the particular 
parcel of land is not zoned for medical uses, the medical services it
offers constitute its religious exercise and that it is therefore entitled to 
use the property for medical purposes10 under the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).11 RLUIPA provides: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the 
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person, assembly, or institution––(A) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.12 
Although the question of whether Hand of Hope suffered a 
“substantial burden” surfaced in both plaintiff’s13 and defendant’s14 
7. Id. at 989–90. 
8. See id. at 992 (“Hand of Hope alleges that the City’s actions in denying it permission to
provide free pregnancy support—including the use of limited obstetrical ultrasounds—at the
Property violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (‘RLUIPA’) . . . .”).
 9. Complaint ¶¶ 106–13, Hand of Hope, 332 F. Supp. 3d 983 (No. 5:16-cv-00746); see also
id. ¶ 110 (“Raleigh has imposed or implemented its land use regulations in a manner that has 
caused and continues to cause Hand of Hope delay, uncertainty, and expense in the exercise of 
their religiously motivated activities sufficient to constitute a substantial burden in the RLUIPA
context.”). Hand of Hope also argued that the City of Raleigh violated its First Amendment rights
to freedom of expression and free exercise. Id. ¶¶ 48–64, 96–105. It also claimed that the city
unfairly discriminated against the Center in violation of the Equal Terms Provision of RLUIPA 
(42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2018)). Id. ¶¶ 114–20. Finally, Hand of Hope stated causes of action
for expecting mothers and religious organizations under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause. Id. ¶¶ 65–89. 
10. Id. ¶¶ 106–13. 
11. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)
(2018).  
12. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
 13. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 110.
14. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7–14, 18,
Hand of Hope, 332 F. Supp. 3d 983 (No. 5:16–cv–00746) [hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum]. 
The City of Raleigh argued that even if the court found that the provision of medical services
qualifies as religious exercise, that exercise had not been substantially burdened: Hand of Hope 
can “assemble, pray and communicate any type of spiritual message on the Property,” it can be
“present, assemble and share [its] faith,” but simply cannot perform “medical uses” on the
property. Id. at 2, 7. It argued that Hand of Hope “can still freely share its pro-life message at the
Property . . . and can also use ultrasounds as a part of its ministry in any of the other districts that 
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1356 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1353
arguments, the threshold issue15 to be decided was whether the
institution’s medical services, and specifically the provision of
ultrasounds to pregnant women, qualified as “religious exercise” under
the language of RLUIPA.16 
Hand of Hope argued that its medical services, which it views as 
the manifestation of its Christian beliefs, should qualify as religious 
exercise.17 In its complaint against the City of Raleigh, Hand of Hope 
wrote that its “ministry of providing free pregnancy education and 
support services to and sharing the message of the Gospel with
expectant mothers are religious expressive activities” that should be 
protected.18 Hand of Hope understands its services as a form of
“ministry” that is “carried out by an active group of concerned
Christians committed to providing . . . a message of hope and life
affirming support.”19 The provision of medical ultrasounds, which are 
used to show expecting mothers early images of their unborn children, 
is a tool that Hand of Hope believes is central to sharing a life-affirming
Christian message.20 Indeed, the self-described mission of Hand of 
are zoned for commercial use.” Id. at 9 (quotations omitted). This Note does not address the 
question of whether Hand of Hope would succeed under the substantial burden and compelling 
interest analysis but instead asks only whether the provision of medical services meets the 
threshold question of qualifying as religious exercise. 
15. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029–30 (3d. Cir. 1981) (“[T]wo threshold 
requirements must be met before particular beliefs, alleged to be religious in nature, are accorded
first amendment protection” are whether those beliefs are “(1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in
nature, in the claimant’s scheme of things. If either of these two requirements is not satisfied, the
court need not reach the question . . . whether a legitimate and reasonably exercised state interest
outweighs the proffered first amendment claim.” (citations omitted)).  
16. Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 14, at 14–16. The district court found that Hand
of Hope was not entitled to a preliminary injunction against the City of Raleigh on its substantial
burden claim because Hand of Hope “ha[d] not made a ‘clear showing’ of likelihood of success
on the merits on its substantial burden claim,” having failed to show that it had a reasonable
expectation of using the property as a pregnancy resource center at the time of purchase. Hand
of Hope, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 1005–06. But note that the court did not address the question of
whether a medical clinic would qualify for RLUIPA protections as religious exercise. In doing so,
the court seems to assume that Hand of Hope’s conduct met the threshold determination of
qualifying as “religious exercise” deserving of further substantial burden analysis. Id. at 1005. 
17. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 109–10. 
18. Id. ¶ 50. 
19. Id. ¶ 97; see also Mission Statement, HAND OF HOPE PREGNANCY RESOURCE CTR. 
(2019) https://www.handofhope.net/about-us/our-mission [https://perma.cc/83T5-8ZUJ] (“As the
Body of Christ in this community, we want to give the preborn a chance to live, we want to offer
women life-affirming choices for their babies and post-abortive women and men a chance for
healing and restoration. We accomplish this through our many client services.”).
 20. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 97 (“As a Christian center, we affirm the value of life from
conception by compassionately sharing the gospel of Jesus Christ; and assisting individuals facing
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Hope is to “affirm the value of life from conception by compassionately 
sharing the gospel of Jesus Christ; and assisting individuals facing the 
challenges of an unplanned pregnancy.”21 Hand of Hope looks to
Christian Scripture to support its pro-life outreach.22 In short, Hand of 
Hope views all of its services, including those that are ostensibly 
“medical,” as the “outreach ministry of Jesus Christ through His 
church.”23 
The City of Raleigh rejected Hand of Hope’s position, arguing 
that medical services such as ultrasounds were not “religious exercise”
but a decidedly secular activity and therefore deserved no special 
protection under RLUIPA.24 The City stated: “RLUIPA does not 
protect secular activities like medical clinics” and thus, “[p]laintiff 
misplaces reliance on RLUIPA.”25 In making this claim, the City of
Raleigh made a distinction between the religious status of the property
owner that performs the activity and the religious nature of the activity
itself, noting “not every activity carried out by a religious entity or 
individual constitutes religious exercise . . . . ‘[R]eligious exercise’ does
not encompass activities—even well-intentioned ones—that extend 
beyond the core missions of a church and are commonly performed by
secular entities.”26 In other words, according to the City, even though 
Hand of Hope is a religious nonprofit whose mission is to share the 
gospel through its pro-life services, its actions are not necessarily
religious exercise simply because they are done by a religious actor;
“[s]ecular means [] to religious end[s] . . . do not render the means 
religious.”27 
Hand of Hope’s case exemplifies a particular difficulty in the 
RLUIPA regime: defining and articulating the exact scope of the term 
“religious exercise” under that statute. Does RLUIPA presume a 
meaningful difference between what a religious organization is—its
the challenges of an unplanned pregnancy, to minister to the emotional and spiritual needs
resulting from abortion to miscarriage and to promote sexual abstinence until marriage.”). 
21. Id. ¶ 9.
 22. Id. ¶¶ 10, 22 (citing Lamentations 2:19, James 2:16, Mark 16:15, and 1 Timothy 4:13 as
scriptural support for its pro-life gospel message).
 23. Id. ¶ 11. For further description of the center’s “ministry” and its specific activities,
services, and provisions, see id. ¶¶ 13, 22–24. For the center’s assertion that God “called” it to
purchase the property adjacent to the abortion clinic, see id. ¶¶ 19–20. 
24. Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 14, at 15–18.
 25. Id. (emphasis added). 
26. Id. at 15–16 (quotations omitted).
 27. Id. at 17. For a summary of the outcome of Hand of Hope, see infra note 207 and 
accompanying text.
BRENNAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2020 7:47 PM        
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status as a religiously affiliated entity—and what a religious 
organization does—that is, the actions that the religious entity 
performs? Consider a few examples: Does a religious organization
perform religious exercise when it teaches liturgical dance classes, 
houses refugees or illegal immigrants, or hosts a soup kitchen for
homeless persons? What if an institution operates a Christian radio 
show or constructs administrative offices for synagogue staff? What 
about a “mega-church” that runs a large multi-purpose facility that 
houses sports events, charity concerts, and fundraising dinners?28 
This Note contends that there is no meaningful difference between 
a religious organization’s status and conduct. Specifically, it argues that 
individual or organizational religious identity cannot be properly 
separated from the actions of the individual or organization. Like 
Justice Gorsuch in Trinity Lutheran, “I harbor doubts about the
stability of such a line.”29 Rather than impose a strict, artificial binary 
between religious and secular activity, this Note proposes that in order 
to count as “religious exercise” under RLUIPA, a proposed land use 
must be (1) a formal worship use; (2) a traditionally accepted 
“accessory use,” necessary and customarily incidental to the property’s 
function, but subordinate to the principal use; or (3) a use motivated
by—and an extension of—a religious entity’s sincere religious beliefs. 
This proposed standard is intentionally broad and seeks to include any 
actions of the religious entity motivated by sincere religious belief. It 
advises courts to inquire only into the sincerity of the religious belief
that motivates the claimant’s desired land use, rather than undertake 
the difficult task of arbitrarily deciding what does and does not fit 
within the confines of “religious activity.” 
To make this argument, this Note proceeds in three parts. Part I 
traces RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision to the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence and highlights the Court’s decision to 
use sincerity as the defining test for what counts as legitimate belief. It
then examines the statutory text of RLUIPA’s substantial burden
28. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Evans-Cowley & Kenneth Pearlman, Six Flags over Jesus: RLUIPA,
Megachurches, and Zoning, 4 TUL. ENVT’L. L.J. 203, 208 (2008) (noting that lawsuits concerning
the non-worship activities of megachurches are proliferating); Sara C. Galvan, Note, Beyond
Worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and Religious
Institutions’ Auxiliary Uses, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 207, 209–10 (2006) (“RLUIPA could help 
[a] megachurch avoid complying with zoning codes, city planning goals, historic preservation
ordinances, traffic requirements, and aesthetic regulations—resulting in a greater impact on
neighborhoods and towns than the law’s framers might have envisioned”).
29. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025–26 (2017).


















   
   
  
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1359
provision and explores the statute’s legislative history to argue that 
RLUIPA’s drafters intended a broad understanding of “religious 
exercise.”30 Part II reviews appellate and lower court decisions to
analyze the reasoning deployed when determining what non-worship
land uses are included within RLUIPA’s scope. Lastly, Part III 
articulates an original limiting principle for determining the bounds of 
what should count as religious exercise in the land use context. It then 
applies the proposed principle to the Hand of Hope case study, 
concluding that as the extension of its sincere Christian beliefs, Hand
of Hope’s provision of medical services should constitute “religious
exercise” under RLUIPA. 
I. RLUIPA: BACKGROUND, TEXT, AND PURPOSE
To understand RLUIPA’s “religious exercise” provision, it is first 
necessary to understand the statute’s history, text, and purpose. This 
Part begins by placing the Act within the broader context of the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, demonstrating
RLUIPA to be largely a reaction to the Court’s curtailment of free 
exercise rights in the early 1990s. Next, this Part presents the text of 
RLUIPA itself, noting its broad and generally undefined language. It 
finally seeks to reconcile and make sense of some of the statute’s 
ambiguity by articulating the legislative purpose behind RLUIPA.
A. RLUIPA in Context 
This Section briefly examines the Supreme Court’s evolving 
attempts to define the term “religion” and situates the passage of 
RLUIPA within the context of this jurisprudence.31 Generally, in cases 
of religious accommodation, people or groups that object to generally
applicable laws on religious grounds must seek an exemption from that
law by showing that it substantially burdens their First Amendment 
right to free exercise of religion.32 In two central cases, Sherbert v. 
30. See infra Part I.B.
31. One scholar has noted that on matters of religious freedom, “the courts’ doctrines and
decisions . . . exhibit no intelligible or coherent pattern.” STEVEN D. SMITH, THE
DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 109 (2010).
32. See Eugene Volokh, A Brief Political History of Religious Exemptions, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2015, 9:39 AM), https://reason.com/2015/01/21/a-brief-political-history-of-r
[https://perma.cc/4H4A-N8Y3] (explaining that in order to create a “peaceful . . . coexistence” 
lawmakers “creat[ed] exemptions for specific groups, or for people who had specific beliefs”).
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Verner33 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,34 the Supreme Court held that state 
actions that substantially burden a person’s religious exercise must pass 
strict scrutiny analysis35 or the objector will be granted a religious 
exemption.36 
Despite providing “specific rules” for how religion should be 
treated,37 and despite many judicial opinions that articulate in detail 
what the strict scrutiny analysis entails, neither the First Amendment 
nor its subsequent jurisprudence38 successfully defines the foundational 
term at the heart of the analysis: “religion.”39 Dean Eduardo Peñalver,
at the time a student at Yale Law School, noted:
33. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held that a state’s denial 
of benefits to an employee who refused to work on the Sabbath substantially burdened the 
employee’s free exercise right in the absence of a compelling state interest. Id. at 410.
34. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Court held that a law requiring 
all children up to the age of sixteen to attend school substantially burdened the free exercise right 
of the Amish plaintiffs who objected to their children attending school past the age of fourteen
on religious grounds. Id. at 234. 
35. As Professor Volokh observed: 
[T]he Court adopted what later came to be called the Sherbert/Yoder test: Religious
objectors are presumptively constitutionally entitled to exemptions from federal, state,
or local laws that substantially burden their religious practice—e.g., by requiring them
to do something they view as religiously forbidden, by forbidding them from doing
something they view as religiously required. . . . That presumption can be rebutted (and
it often was), but only when denying an exemption was seen as necessary to serve a
compelling government interest.  
Volokh, supra note 32. Strict scrutiny mandates that “if a government action substantially burdens
the exercise of religion . . . the government must demonstrate that imposing the burden serves a 
compelling public interest and does so by the least restrictive means.” 146 CONG. REC. S7,774
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (describing the reinstitution of the strict scrutiny standard with the 
passage of RLUIPA).
 36. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (“A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly 
burdens the free exercise of religion.”); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (“We must next consider whether
some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute 
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right.”). Yoder further
explained: “The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those 
interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
37. Jonathan P. Kuhn, Note, The Religious Difference: Equal Protection and the 
Accommodation of (Non)-Religion, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 191, 191 (2016).
38. Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) 
(“One of the few things constitutional scholars of every stripe seem to agree about is the
proposition that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is an incoherent mess.” (citation
omitted)).
39. Eduardo Pe ñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 791 (1997) (“Far
less frequently, however, have the courts expressly considered the meaning of the concept that
stands at the very heart of the Religion Clauses: religion.”).



















    
     
   
 




   




   
    
   
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1361
Religion is a commonly used and widely understood term in our
everyday language, not some obscure term of art in need of technical 
definition. Indeed, when the Supreme Court discusses “religion,” 
most of the time it uses the word unreflectively as if it were completely
self-defining.40 
Accordingly, “it simply does not appear there is any essence of religion, 
with which a belief becomes religious and without which a belief cannot
be religious.”41 
In some cases, however, the Court was unable to avoid this 
definitional question and tried to articulate a workable understanding
of religion. For example, the Court in Yoder took a centrality approach
and focused on the importance of the plaintiffs’ beliefs to their Amish
religion.42 The Court made clear that “it would not carve out an
exemption to Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance laws for 
parents or children whose action was not directly grounded in religious 
belief.”43 The Court also made a distinction between those actions that 
are “philosophical and personal rather than religious,”44 comparing the 
Amish plaintiffs to philosopher Henry David Thoreau and stating that 
Thoreau’s inward spirituality did not amount to religious belief in the
same way that the plaintiffs’ beliefs did.45 Although the Court’s 
comparison attempted to explain the distinction between personal 
philosophies, political ideology, and religion, “it is not clear that such a 
distinction is actually possible.”46 Yoder was not the first time, however, 
that the Court attempted to define the contours of religion. 
40. Id.
 41. Kuhn, supra note 37, at 192; see also Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized
Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 75 (2013) (“In American law, there is no set of
necessary and sufficient conditions that will make something a ‘religion.’”).
 42. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (“Amish communities today are
characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate
and apart from the world and worldly influence. This concept of life aloof from the world and its
values is central to their faith.” (emphasis added)). 
 43. H.N. Hirsch, Let Them Eat Incidentals: RFRA, the Rehnquist Court, and Freedom of 
Religion, in  OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES, infra note 51, at 280, 288 (citing Yoder, 406
U.S. at 210). 
44. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. 
45. Id. (explaining that when Thoreau chose to “reject[] the social values of his time and
isolate[] himself at Walden Pond,” his “belief [did] not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses”). 
46. Kuhn, supra note 37, at 192 (observing that Black’s Law Dictionary “qualifies every
factor that it includes in its definition of religion, leaving nothing concrete in the concept”).
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In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court articulated in
Davis v. Beason47 a “theistic”—that is, god-centered—definition of 
religion, stating that religious belief consists of “one’s views of his 
relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of 
reverence for his being and his character and of obedience to his will.”48 
Similarly, in United States v. Macintosh,49 Chief Justice Hughes wrote
in dissent that an exemption should be made for those who hold a 
“belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation.”50 This approach suggests that there are 
certain elements or “essences” that must be present for a system of 
beliefs to qualify as a religion.51 However, in Torcaso v. Watkins,52 the 
Court moved away from a purely theistic view of religion and
recognized that the Free Exercise Clause also protects the practice of 
religions that are inwardly spiritual but which do not worship a
personal god, including the practice of Buddhism, Taoism, and Secular 
47. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
48. Id. at 342.
49. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
 50. Id. at 633–34 (Hughes, C.J. dissenting). The Court in Macintosh ultimately denied
respondent’s petition for naturalization because he objected on grounds of religious conscience
to participation in the war but was not awarded the exemption when he refused to follow the 
required terms of citizenship. See id. at 625–26. 
51. Content-based definitions attempt to distill the concept of religion to a set of necessary
requirements such as the worship of a deity, reliance on a holy text, submission to moral doctrines,
adherence to traditional practices such as attending a weekly worship service or participating in
sacraments, and the presence of “faith.” See Kent Greenawalt, Five Questions About Religion
Judges Are Afraid To Ask, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 196, 207
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000) (cautioning that any judicial test that counts as religious only 
those systems of beliefs that meet certain factor tests such as reliance on a supreme being or belief 
in extra–temporal consequences is “worrisome,” and proposing instead an analogical approach
to the definition). Critics of multi-factor “essence of religion” tests regard such definitions as
dangerously limiting. See, e.g., Pe ñalver, supra note 39, at 811. (“Because it spells out essential
characteristics, a dictionary style definition of religion runs the risk that the use of religion in
everyday language will broaden in the future . . . leaving the courts with a definition of religion
that favors certain religions over others.”); see also Courtney Miller, Note, “Spiritual But Not
Religious”: Rethinking the Legal Definition of Religion, 102 VA. L. REV. 833, 869 (2011) (“[B]y
relying solely on specific language contained in certain opinions, the literalist approach does not 
explain how it reconciles or fleshes out the doctrine.”).
52. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 










   
   
  
    
 
    
  
 
     





    
    
 
   
   
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1363
Humanism.53 The Court then announced in United States v. Seeger54 
that persons who possess “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which 
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the 
God” are owed religious accommodations.55 There, the Court analyzed 
the issue of whether Seeger, a pacifist who objected to military service,
was entitled to an exemption under the Universal Military Training
and Service Act,56 which excepted conscientious objectors from 
military service if their reasons for objection were grounded in belief
in a “Supreme Being.”57 Seeger admitted that he did not have a belief 
about the existence of God and in fact was ambivalent about the 
matter.58 Instead, he argued that his objection should be recognized 
because it stemmed from religious study and faith, not merely his 
personal morals.59 The Court held that under the statutory language of 
“religious belief,” Seeger was entitled to conscientious objector status 
despite the absence of an explicit belief in a “Supreme Being”—a term 
which the court acknowledged was difficult to define—because of his 
“unquestioned sincerity” in beliefs that occupied the same place in his 
life as belief in a God.60 
These cases illustrate that sincerity of belief, rather than the 
content of the beliefs themselves, is the lodestar in defining what 
constitutes bona fide religious belief and practice in the Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.61 This “sincerity approach” has expanded 
53. Id. at 495–96 (holding that the state cannot “aid those religions based on a belief in the 
existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs” such as “Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others”). Later, in Thomas v. Review Board of 
the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the Court solidified this rule from
Torcaso, holding that the State cannot prefer theistic religions over nontheistic ones without 
violating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 716 (“[I]t is clear that Thomas terminated his
employment for religious reasons.”). 
54. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
 55. Id. at 176.
56. Military Selective Service Act, Pub. L. No. 759, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3806 (2018)).
57. 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j).
 58. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166–67. 
59. Id.
 60. Id. at 177, 187. 
61. In contrast to the sincerity approach, the Third Circuit proposed an analogical approach
to defining “religion.” See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d. Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 
592 F.2d 197, 198 (3d. Cir. 1979). An analogical approach is “a methodology for determining 
whether or not a specific belief system is a religion, rather than a definition in the dictionary
sense.” Peñ alver, supra note 39, at 794. Definition by analogy suggests setting criteria based on
the characteristics of commonly accepted “religions,” such as whether the belief system concerns
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the protections afforded to adherents seeking religious 
accommodation.62 Under the sincerity approach, it is not what is 
believable but rather what is sincerely believed that is the defining 
factor in determining whether a person’s religious exercise has been
substantially burdened.63 Accordingly, courts are reluctant to inquire
into the substance, coherency, or uniformity of religious belief.64 In 
fact, “[r]eligious observances need not be uniform to merit the
protection of the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . [because d]iffering beliefs 
and practices are not uncommon among followers of a particular 
creed.”65 Assessing the sincerity of a belief requires giving “due regard 
to the uncertainty that is often a part of religious conviction and to the
possibility of a kind of cognitive dissonance that allows people to
embrace propositions that are in severe tension with each other.”66 
Thus, if the court determines that a petitioner sincerely holds a belief,
there is no further inquiry into whether the belief is “sufficiently
grounded in religious doctrine to deserve protection.”67 
The sincerity approach tends to favor the plaintiff seeking 
accommodations for her religious exercise because it does not second-
guess the importance of the belief to the claimant’s religion. That
favoritism for sincere religious believers shifted in 1990, however, in 
the landmark case Employment Division v. Smith,68 where the Court 
made it much more difficult to succeed on a free exercise claim, even
itself with “fundamental problems of human existence” and claims a “comprehensive truth.”
Greenawalt, supra note 51, at 210; see also Miller, supra note 51, at 871–72. 
62. The sincerity approach stems from the language of Seeger. There, the Court stated that
“[the] task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether
they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.” Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added).
 63. See id. at 185 (“[W]hile the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the 
significant question whether it is ‘truly held.’”); Andy G. Olree, The Continuing Threshold Test
for Free Exercise Claims, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103, 108 (2008) (“The test has never
required claimants to prove their religious beliefs are true, only that they are religious in nature
and sincerely held.”).
64. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990) (opining that 
judges should not “question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith or the validity 
of particular litigants’ interpretation of [a particular denomination’s] creeds” (quoting Hernandez
v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))).  
65. Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986).  
66. Greenawalt, supra note 51, at 205.
 67. Miller, supra note 51, at 852; see Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether
the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common
faith.”).
68. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).














   
  
 
   
       
  
   
 
    
      




   
      
  




   
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1365
for sincere religious beliefs.69 In Smith, members of the Native
American Church sought exemption from a generally applicable
statute that made drug use illegal, arguing that smoking peyote was 
part of their religious ritual.70 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court 
claimed that it had never held that “an individual’s religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting 
conduct that the State is free to regulate”71 and that it was not an 
unconstitutional violation to deny church members their 
unemployment compensation when the denial resulted from their use 
of the drugs.72 Effectively overturning the use of the strict scrutiny
standard for questions of religious accommodation, the Court instead
relied on a rational basis test.73 Accordingly, the opinion in Smith
“ma[de] it seem that the rare victories for Free Exercise over the
previous decades were to be obliterated entirely.”74 In response, 
Congress passed RFRA75 and RLUIPA76 to effectively overturn Smith
and reinstate the strict scrutiny analysis articulated in Sherbert and 
Yoder.77 
69. See id. at 890 (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require nondiscriminatory
religious practice exemptions in state drug laws).
 70. Id. at 874.
 71. Id. at 878–79. 
72. Id. at 890.
 73. Id. at 883 (rejecting the claim that “religious exemption must be evaluated under the
balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) . . . [under which] governmental
actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest”). 
74. Aviam Soifer, The Fullness of Time, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS 
OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES, supra note 51, at 245,
255.
75. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-41, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2018)); see also 146 CONG. REC. 16,702 (2000)
(explaining that Smith “largely eliminated the strict scrutiny test for free exercise cases. . . . [and]
in direct response to the Smith decision, the 103rd Congress enacted the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act (RFRA), reapplying and extending the strict scrutiny test to all government 
actions” (emphasis added)). 
76. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114
Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2018)); see also Yellowbear v.
Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 52–53 (10th Cir. 2014) (“In RLUIPA Congress . . . (re)impose[d] Sherbert’s
balancing test . . . in only two specific arenas, arenas in which Congress found the record of 
religious discrimination particularly clear and compelling[:] . . . in the land use context . . . [and]
in the prison context . . . .”).
 77. Hirsch, supra note 43, at 283. RLIUPA has explicitly codified the strict scrutiny test: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious 
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the 
burden on that person, assembly, or institution––(A) is in furtherance of a compelling 
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B. RLUIPA’s Broad Definition: Statutory Text and Interpretation
Despite Congress’s desire to reestablish strong protections for free 
exercise and religious accommodation in RLUIPA by reinstating strict 
scrutiny and providing a specific definition of “religious exercise,” the 
statute’s language does not completely resolve the general ambiguity 
in this term.78 Indeed, as the Court has noted, “[t]he determination of 
what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a difficult
and delicate task.”79 However, analyzing the statutory scheme shows 
that the statute does some work to guide courts on the application of
its terms.80 
RLUIPA protects persons and institutions from land-use 
regulations that “impose[] a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution.”81 
Persons who feel that a land-use law has substantially burdened their 
religious exercise have a claim to accommodation or exemption under
RLUIPA.82 To succeed in challenging a land-use regulation or zoning 
ordinance under RLUIPA, the plaintiff must meet a three-part test:
governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of
Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2009) (“If we’re right that section 2000cc(a)(1) of RLUIPA
codifies Sherbert v. Verner . . . .”); Soifer, supra note 74, at 254 (noting that these statutes
attempted to deploy “congressional power to remedy the deprivation of rights against a 
background of judicial failure to do so”).
78. The question may be fairly raised as to what extent the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding religious belief bears on the statutory definition of religious exercise
provided in RLUIPA. When Congress passed RLUIPA, it intended to provide even broader
protection than that offered by the Court’s jurisprudence in Sherbert and Yoder. See Greene v.
Solano Cty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (commenting that Congress “distinguish[ed]
RLUIPA from traditional First Amendment jurisprudence . . . [by] expand[ing] the reach of the
protection to include any ‘religious exercise,’ including ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by or central to, a system of religious belief’” (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709 (2005)); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.
2003) (“Congress’s intent to expand the concept of religious exercise [previously]
contemplated . . . in traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
79. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981).
 80. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2000cc-5 (providing definitions, rules of construction,
and other guidelines). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
82. The relevant part of the RLUIPA provides:  
[G]overnment may avoid the preemptive force of any provision of this chapter
by . . . retaining the policy or practice and exempting the substantially burdened
religious exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy or practice for applications
that substantially burden religious exercise, or by any other means that eliminates the 
substantial burden. 
Id. § 2000cc-3(e). 


















   
     
  
   
   
      
   
    
 
      
    
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1367
the claimant must show that “he wishes to engage in (1) a religious 
exercise (2) motivated by a sincerely held belief, which exercise (3) is 
subject to a substantial burden imposed by the government.”83 If a
government action substantially burdens the plaintiff’s sincere exercise 
of religion, “the government must demonstrate that imposing the 
burden serves a compelling public interest and does so by the least 
restrictive means.”84 The strict scrutiny test allows for a balance 
between protecting a broad scope of religious exercise and 
acknowledging that some governmental interests are important
enough to outweigh even a substantial burden on that exercise. As a
reaction against Smith, RLUIPA sought both to reinstate strict scrutiny 
and to “define[] ‘religious exercise’ capaciously.”85 Indeed, both the
plain text of RLUIPA and the legislative history behind the statute’s 
passage strongly suggest that the drafters intended a broad 
interpretation of the term “religious exercise.”86 
First, the text of RLUIPA reveals a broad interpretation of 
religious exercise. In the statute’s definition section, “religious 
exercise” is defined as “any exercise of religion.”87 As the Fifth Circuit
has noted, this “generous”88 and “broad” definition “evinces 
Congress’s intent to expand the concept of religious exercise that was
used by courts in identifying ‘exercise of religion’ in RFRA cases.”89 
“To remove any remaining doubt regarding how broadly Congress 
aimed to define religious exercise,”90 the statute then expressly dictates 
broad construction: “This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by 
the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”91 The mandate of this 
provision is clear: when in doubt, err on the side of protecting more,
not less, religious exercise.
83. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1312 (10th Cir. 2010).
 84. 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000). 
85. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 385 (2015).
 86. See Galvan, supra note 28, at 208 (“Under RLUIPA, Congress wanted religious exercise
to be broadly construed—‘to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the statute] and the
Constitution.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g))). The statute’s language 
appears to “provide maximal protection of religious exercise.” Jason Z. Pesick, Note, RLUIPA:
What’s the Use?, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 359, 367 (2012).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (emphasis added). 
88. Adkins v. Caspar, 393 F.3d 559, 568 (5th Cir. 2009). 
89. Id. at 567.
90. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir. 2007).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2018).
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Looking to the context of its passage, it is clear that RLUIPA was 
designed to reinstate the broad protections for religious liberty that 
were diluted after the Smith decision and even to correct courts’ 
misapplication of a preceding statute, RFRA.92 Under RFRA, many
courts had held that a petitioner’s conduct would qualify as religious 
exercise only if it was central to the person’s religious belief.93 
RLUIPA’s drafters felt that this was a mistake and did not want the 
same misunderstanding of the statute’s intended scope to occur in cases 
brought under RLUIPA. Accordingly, the drafters provided the 
express negation of a centrality requirement.94 And after RLUIPA’s 
passage, RFRA was actually amended to incorporate the same
definition for “religious exercise” that is now provided in RLUIPA to 
prevent future misapplication of RFRA.95 
92. Congress first tried to pass a bill entitled the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998 
(“RLPA”), but the bill was not enacted into law because of various issues with the statute’s
language, including the concern that the statute would override certain civil rights laws. 146 CONG 
REC. S7778 (2000). This precursor to RLUIPA was a direct reaction against both Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the latter
of which invalidated RFRA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is therefore instructive for thinking about the breadth of
protection that Congress would have considered as it drafted the narrower RLUIPA statute. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 40 (1999) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court’s Decision in Smith set a
truly dangerous precedent” and describing the need for RLPA to reinstate broad protections for
religious liberty); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-1048, at 272 (2000) (commenting that RLUIPA’s
passage would ensure the “level of protection” expected of a “society that values religious
liberty”).
 93. See e.g., Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the religious services denied to the plaintiff were not “fundamental to [his] religion”
and thus this denial did not substantially burden his free exercise rights); Bryant v. Gomez, 46
F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the religious activities prevented by the government
must be “mandated by the . . . religion” for the interference to constitute a substantial burden on
a person’s free exercise rights); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that governmental action must inhibit some “central tenet” of a person’s religious beliefs to
constitute a substantial burden on his free exercise rights).
 94. 146 CONG. REC. 19,124 (2000) (extension of remarks of Rep. Canady) (observing that
while the absence of a centrality requirement was “consistent with RFRA’s legislative
history . . . much unnecessary litigation resulted from the failure to resolve this question in
statutory text”); see also Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083,
1091 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that although courts analyzing RFRA claims regularly asked
whether the burden was on a belief that was central to religious doctrine, “RLUIPA was intended
to and does upset this test”), rev’d on other grounds, 197 F. App’x 718 (9th Cir. 2006).
95. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274 § 7,
114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2018)) (amending Section 5 of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, “in paragraph (4), by striking all after ‘means’ and
inserting ‘religious exercise, as defined in section 8 of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000’”). Previously, RFRA had defined the “exercise of religion” 















    
 
 
       
  
 
     
     
  
  
   
    
 
 
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1369
The definition section of RLUIPA likewise articulates a broad
rule for defining the term “religious exercise.”96 The provision reads: 
“The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of 
religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the
person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that 
purpose.”97 Admittedly, this is a strangely worded provision that seems 
almost tautological, using the term “religious exercise” to define
“religious exercise.”  
Attempting to clarify, the Department of Justice, which has the 
authority to investigate RLUIPA violations and enforce the statute by
bringing lawsuits against alleged violators on behalf of the United 
States,98 interprets this provision in the following way: “[§ 2000cc-
5(7)(B)] makes clear that religious exercise under RLUIPA includes 
construction or expansion of places of worship and other properties 
used for religious exercise.”99 For example, if “[a] church is denied a 
permit to build an addition to accommodate more Sunday school 
classes, which it believes it needs to carry out its religious mission[, t]his
may violate RLUIPA if the town cannot show a compelling reason for 
the denial.”100 And in fact, many courts have affirmed that the 
construction of a church or the expansion of an existing church facility 
qualifies as religious exercise under this provision.101 One district court 
as “the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution.” Pub. L. No. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1489 (1993). 
96. Id. § 2000cc-5.
 97. Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(B).
 98. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIV. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/crt/religious-land-use-and-institutionalized-
persons-act [https://perma.cc/EU32-3R63].
 99. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., STATEMENT OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE ON
THE LAND USE PROVISIONS OF RLUIPA 4 (June 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/ 
1071251/download [https://perma.cc/9J6H-2RKZ].
 100. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INFORMATION ABOUT: FEDERAL 
RELIGIOUS LAND USE PROTECTIONS, https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/1070736/download
[https://perma.cc/GNA8-96CG].
 101. BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION
§ 7:28 (2019 ed.); see also Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder
Cty., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009) (holding that the “denial of a church’s expansion
proposal can constitute a substantial burden” on religious exercise); Mintz v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Springfield, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that the Catholic Church’s
application for permit to construct parish center was a protected “extension” of the church’s
“religious exercise” when the center would be used for a religious education office, a meeting 
place for parish council, and other church gatherings). 
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has gone as far as to state that this provision “definitionally equat[es]
land use with ‘religious exercise.’”102 
Though RLUIPA protects only those exercises “motivated by 
religious faith” and not “every act born of personal conscience or 
philosophical conviction,”103 the statute rejects the idea that a specific 
land use must be mandated by or central to the claimant’s asserted
religion.104 In fact, it expressly does away with a centrality
requirement.105 This was an intentional decision by RLUIPA’s drafters 
to correct the existing practice by courts to consider the centrality of
the specific exercise to the adherent’s faith.106 In fact before RLUIPA:  
[Z]oning regulations and decisions . . . have not generally been
held . . . to impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. Clearly,
RLUIPA was intended to and does upset this test. By explicitly 
prescribing that the centrality of a religious belief is
immaterial . . . RLUIPA establishes an entirely new and different 
standard than that employed in prior Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence.107 
Instead, RLUIPA expressly provides that “any exercise of religion” 
counts as religious exercise “whether or not compelled by, or central 
to, a system of religious belief.”108 
The express negation of the centrality requirement effectively
means that a religious person’s beliefs will not be subject to judicial 
scrutiny about whether their beliefs are fundamental tenets of the 
religion and thus justify the statute’s protection.109 In other words,
102. Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1091 (C.D. Cal.
2003), rev’d on other grounds, 197 F. App’x 718 (9th Cir. 2006).
103. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 53 (10th Cir. 2014); see also John J. Dvorske,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc et seq.), 181 A.L.R. FED. 247 § 8 (2002) (“[T]he claim
must be rooted in religious belief and not purely secular philosophical concerns.”).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2018).
 105. Pesick, supra note 86, at 367 (“RLUIPA eliminates a centrality-of-belief test that would
have courts inquire into how central an activity is to a system of religious belief before deciding if
the activity qualifies as religious exercise.”).
106. Men of Destiny Ministries, Inc. v. Osceola Cty., No. 6:06-cv-624, 2006 WL 3219321, at *4
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) (“Prior to the passage of RLUIPA, courts considering whether
government activity imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise . . . generally considered
whether the religious exercise implicated by zoning decisions was integral to a believer’s faith.”). 
107. Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090–91 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (citations omitted).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2018).
109. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether
a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a . . . religion.”).














    
  
    
 
 
    
  
  
   
    











2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1371
“when a sincere religious claimant draws a line ruling in or out a 
particular religious exercise, it is not for a court to say that the line he 
drew was an unreasonable one.”110 The Supreme Court has rejected on 
more than one occasion the idea that its members should probe
religious doctrine, stating that “the resolution [of what counts as
religious belief and practice] is not to turn upon a judicial perception
of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need 
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in
order to merit First Amendment protection.”111 Accordingly, RLUIPA
explicitly articulates that it is not the role of courts to question how a
secular land use fits into a belief system; instead, the claimant must 
show only the sincerity of the beliefs that give rise to the desired use. 
Sincerity then is a different element than centrality.112 RLUIPA
“does not offer refuge to canny operators who seek through subterfuge 
to avoid laws they’d prefer to ignore. . . . But [instead] ask[s] whether 
a claimant truly holds a religious belief,” which “isn’t to suggest we may 
decide whether the claimant’s religious belief is true.”113 Accordingly,
then-Judge Gorsuch noted that while “trying to separate the sacred 
from the secular can be a tricky business . . . at least one feature of the 
statute’s ‘religiosity’ requirement often proves relatively unintrusive in 
its application and not infrequently dispositive: the question of sincere 
belief.”114 
110. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 55 (10th Cir. 2014).
111. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); Fowler v. Rhode 
Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (“[I]t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice
or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment.”);
Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54 (“Just as civil courts lack any warrant to decide the truth of a religion, 
in RLUIPA Congress made plain that we also lack any license to decide the relative value of a 
particular exercise to a religion.”).
 112. See, e.g., Sossaman v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 332 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The 
practice burdened need not be central to the adherent’s belief system, but the adherent must have
an honest belief that the practice is important to his free exercise of religion.”); Kay v. Bemis, 500
F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Sincerely held is different from central, and courts have rightly
shied away from attempting to gauge how central a sincerely held belief is to the believer’s
religion.”); see also Dvorske, supra note 103, § 8 (“Although Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice
is central to a . . . religion, the RLUIPA does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s
professed religiosity.”).
 113. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54. 
114. Id. at 53–55; see also Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 F. App’x 692, 699 (10th Cir. 2016) (“To
survive a motion to dismiss, therefore, [the plaintiff] was required to allege only that his request
[for accommodation] was motivated by a sincerely held religious belief and that his exercise of
that belief has been substantially burdened by the government.”); Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church
v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An individual claiming violation of free 
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Determining whether a claimed religious belief is sincere or not 
should require minimal inquiry into the belief itself.115 “Th[e] inquiry
is specific to [the plaintiff’s] subjective beliefs: ‘[T]he issue is not
whether the lack of [an accommodation] substantially burdens the 
religious exercise of any [] practitioner, but whether it substantially 
burdens [the plaintiff’s] own exercise of his sincerely held religious 
beliefs.’”116 An action motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs is 
protected “even when it is not a recognized tenet of [an actor’s] religion 
or consistent with the beliefs of others who practice his faith.”117 Judge 
Gorsuch described the test to determine whether an exercise is sincere
this way: 
When inquiring into a claimant’s sincerity, then, [a court’s] task is
instead a more modest one, limited to asking whether the claimant is
(in essence) seeking to perpetrate a fraud on the court—whether he
actually holds the beliefs he claims to hold—a comparatively familiar 
task for secular courts that are regularly called on to make credibility 
assessments—and an important task, too, for ensuring the integrity of
any judicial proceeding.118 
Sincerity concerns itself primarily with excluding fraudulent claims.
The limits on RLUIPA’s scope are mainly defined by excluding only 
those land uses that falsely claim to be religiously motivated in order 
to avoid legitimate zoning regulations. In the absence of fraud, any 
conduct or land use motivated by sincere religious belief will—and
should—always be protected as religious exercise, regardless of its 
connection to a formal worship use. 
This interpretation supports the argument that even land uses that 
appear “secular” at first glance, but which actually are motivated by 
the religious person or entity’s sincere religious belief, should be 
exercise rights need only demonstrate that the beliefs professed are ‘sincerely held’ and in the
individual’s ‘own scheme of things, religious.’” (quoting Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d
Cir. 1984))). 
115. However, though inquiry into the sincerity of belief is largely deferential to plaintiffs,
some “beliefs” are so ridiculous that courts refuse to accept them as legitimately religious. See 
Dvorske, supra note 103, § 8 (observing that requests for accommodations by believers of a 
“divine flying spaghetti monster,” for example, have gone unacknowledged).
 116. Wilkinson, 645 F. Appx at 699–700 (quoting Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 
1314 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
117. Id. at 699.
 118. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54 (emphasis omitted); see also LaPlante v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 
89 F. Supp. 3d 235, 241–42 (D. Mass. 2015) (holding that though a prisoner need not show that his
desired practice is compelled by or central to his religion, he must show that that the belief that
motivates that practice is sincere).
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included within RLUIPA’s scope. For example, a church that seeks to 
house homeless persons in its facility in a nonresidential zone might be 
thought of as doing a civic good—a secular service that any nonprofit 
or nonreligious institution could provide. But when the religious 
institution’s decision to shelter the homeless is actually the concrete 
manifestation of its Christian beliefs, the service becomes the church’s
ministry and should be protected as a sincere religious exercise.  
The legislative history further confirms that Congress intended an
expansive definition of religious exercise that includes more than 
formal worship. For example, during the Senate hearings, the bill’s 
sponsors, Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy, stated that
“[s]ection 2(b)(3) [of RLUIPA] enforces the right to assemble for 
worship or other religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause.”119 
That Congress distinguished “worship” from “other” uses, but 
nonetheless stated that both are “religious exercise,” suggests that 
more than worship uses are protected. In articulating possible types of 
land use that might be considered religious exercise, senators listed a 
number of nontraditional, non-worship examples, including
constructing a Jewish temple,120 operating a homeless shelter,121 
providing meals for the homeless and working poor,122 hosting a radio 
ministry in a mobile home,123 offering mental counseling, holding a 
music concert, hosting a crisis hotline, renting a storefront,124 parking
on days other than Sunday,125 holding weddings and funerals on a 
Saturday,126 and instituting “job training and transitional housing
programs for homeless and abused women” run by nuns.127 
119. 146 CONG. REC. 16,700 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (emphasis 
added).
 120. Id. at 14,284 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
 121. Id. 
122. 146 CONG. REC. S6689 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
123. 146 CONG. REC. 19,125–26 (extension of remarks of Rep. Hyde) (saying that this was an
improper use of the county’s “discretion to determine what constitutes a legitimate ministry of
[the] church”).
 124. Id. (commenting that refusal to grant a church a permit to rent a storefront in effect
“punish[ed] the church for asserting a nontraditional model of worship and outreach”).
 125. Id. (determining that this “inhibit[ed] the religious exercise of minority groups who 
worship on other days”). 
126. Id. at 19,126 (“The City of Jacksonville granted First Presbyterian Church a
permit . . . only if the church met certain conditions. The church would be . . . forbidden to hold
weddings or funerals on Saturdays.”).
 127. Id. at 19,127. 
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What these examples show is that the understanding of religious 
exercise of the bill’s sponsors went beyond protecting formal worship
uses only and included any exercise, even if “nontraditional,” that is 
motivated by sincere religious belief. It is telling that in response to 
these examples, and evidence that zoning authorities frequently placed
substantial burdens on institutions’ religious exercise, Congress 
unanimously passed RLUIPA.128 The unanimous vote of Congress in
both chambers suggests that while Congress rarely speaks with one
voice, with regard to RLUIPA, there was a shared understanding on
both sides that religious liberty deserved greater protection than it was 
afforded post-Smith. 
II. NON-WORSHIP USES UNDER RLUIPA: A REVIEW OF LOWER
COURT DECISIONS
This Part reviews appellate, federal district court, and lower state 
court decisions that have analyzed and applied RLUIPA.129 When 
determining if a use qualifies as religious exercise, courts consider the 
type of activity, rather than the type of organization engaging in the
activity.130 That is, “[c]ourts generally ignore the relationship between 
the proposed land use and the religious character of the institution 
making the use, and instead inquire whether each particular proposed 
land use is ‘for a religious purpose’ . . . .”131 Thus, “the nature of the 
activity, and not the character of the actor, makes an exercise
128. Actions Overview, S2869 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/senate-bill/2869/actions?q=% 
7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s2869%22%5D%7D&r=11&s=1 [https://perma.cc/AVE7-9PZW]
(describing how RLUIPA was passed in both the Senate and the House of Representatives
without objection and with unanimous consent).
129. Although these courts have not been entirely consistent in their application of
RLUIPA’s definition of “religious exercise,” analysis of their reasoning is still illuminative in
revealing what kinds of non-worship land uses have consistently been deemed worthy of statutory
protection.
130. Adam J. MacLeod, A Non-Fatal Collision: Interpreting RLUIPA Where Religious Land
Uses and Community Interests Meet, 42 URB. LAW. 41, 51 (2010).
 131. Id. (citation omitted); see 146 CONG. REC. 16,700 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch
and Sen. Kennedy) (“While recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored
or operated by a religious institution . . . this alone does not automatically bring these activities
or facilities within [RLUIPA’s] definition or ‘religious exercise.’”); see also Scottish Rite
Cathedral Ass’n of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 216 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (“[N]ot every activity carried out by a religious entity or individual constitutes ‘religious
exercise.’” (quoting 146 CONG. REC. 16,700)). But see Shelley Ross Saxer, Faith in Action:
Religious Accessory Uses and Land Use Regulation, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 593, 614 (“The mere fact
that an accessory use is connected to a religious organization does not mean that it should be
protected under RLUIPA, or does it?” (emphasis added)).














    
      
 





      
 
    
        
  
    
     
 
  
    
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1375
religious.”132 “By focusing on the activity rather than the actor in this
way, courts constrain the reach of section (2)(a). A religious landowner
engaging in a land use in which secular landowners routinely engage 
will not necessarily qualify for . . . protection.”133 Thus, whereas formal
worship uses, like hosting a Mass or participating in the sacraments, 
usually receive protection without debate, not all auxiliary uses have 
been included.134 Outside of “traditional” religious activities, it remains 
unclear what other religious exercises garner RLUIPA protection. 
Difficult-to-categorize activities and services are usually outside
the scope of formal worship, prayer, or traditional congregational
activities.135 These forms of non-worship land uses are commonly called 
“accessory uses.” These accessory uses create land-use problems 
because it is unclear if they ought to be “protected against restriction 
by zoning ordinances because they are associated with the free exercise 
of religion”136 or if they are simply too remote from the religious land
use to qualify. Accessory uses come in two types. One type has been 
regularly protected under land-use law prior to the enactment of 
RLUIPA and includes those uses that are not inherently religious but 
instead serve a necessary function that supports the principal religious 
land use.137 Though not religious themselves, these uses are within the 
scope of the religious entity’s expected activities.138 Examples of uses 
falling under this category include expanding parking space,139 
132. MacLeod, supra note 130, at 52 (emphasis added).
 133. Id. 
134. See Galvan, supra note 28, at 208 (“The worship uses of religious institutions have long
been granted special protections by the government of the United States. . . . In the religious land
use context, however, no [clear] line has been drawn.” (emphasis omitted)). 
135. Accessory uses are defined as “non-worship uses that are affiliated with a religious
institution” such as hospitals, health maintenance, transportation, retail and merchandise, 
residences, and cafes, as well as education services, and charities run by religious institutions. Id.
at 207. 
136. Saxer, supra note 131, at 594–95. 
137. Id. at 596–98. 
138. Id. at 615.
 139. BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 7:28 (“A parking lot may be necessary for
the use and enjoyment of a church and the refusal to grant permission for such a parking lot can
be determined to be a free exercise violation.”); see, e.g., Daley v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 770 A.2d
815, 816 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (affirming a zoning board’s decision to allow church to expand
parking lot “to better accommodate parking needs of its members”); Keeling v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals of City of Indianapolis, 69 N.E.2d 613, 618 (Ind. App. Ct. 1946) (holding that parking
lots are permitted accessory uses as they are necessary and useful to the “modern church”). Note,
however, that courts have not always ruled in favor of accessory uses such as parking lots because
the denial of a permit to build or expand a parking lot fails on the substantial burden prong. See,
e.g., Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA–01–CA–1149, 2004 WL
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expanding educational facilities,140 building playgrounds or 
recreational sports fields,141 holding fundraising concerts,142 and 
providing residential housing synagogue staff and members.143 “In this 
regard, a place of religious worship includes not only the sanctuary, but
also those grounds and structures surrounding the sanctuary that is 
necessary for the use and enjoyment of the church” or other religious 
facility.144 
A second type of “accessory use” is one that is more customarily
tied to the religious landowner’s belief system or mission, such as 
offering marital counseling or sheltering and feeding the homeless.
Ultimately, this kind of accessory use includes activities that could be 
accomplished by a nonreligious actor but, when performed by a 
religious one, constitute “faith in action”—an unbroken extension of 
the group’s sincere religious beliefs. As one source notes, “[f]or 
religious groups, faith in practice often consists of much more than
formal worship. . . . Institutions may also seek to provide individuals 
with spiritual nourishment that can include education, recreation, and
the opportunity to serve others by providing social services for the poor 
and needy.”145 But questions of interpretation often arise because
religious institutions and religiously affiliated property owners 
regularly desire to use their property for more than just worship and 
expand uses into traditionally “secular” activities.146 
546792, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004) (“In this case, however, physical access is not precluded;
rather the parties dispute how much physical access—in the form of parking—is necessary.”).
 140. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 347–53 (2d Cir. 
2007) (explaining that the renovation of a religious school was protected under RLUIPA when
the remodeled rooms were determined to serve a religious purpose). 
141. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Ashton, 448 P.2d 185, 192 (Id. 1968) (finding that building a recreational sports field is a
permissible accessory use).
 142. See, e.g., Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 701 (E.D.
Mich. 2004) (finding that a church’s fundraising concert series constituted religious exercise).
143. See, e.g., Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona, 280 F. Supp.
3d 426, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding that a congregation’s construction of multifamily housing for
a rabbinical college was religious exercise), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Nos. 18-0869-cv(L), 18-
1062-cv(XAP), 2019 WL 6975126 (2d Cir. 2019); cf. Beit Havurah v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Norfolk, 418 A.2d 82, 89 (Conn. 1979) (holding that providing overnight sleeping 
accommodations to the synagogue’s members was essential to the “religious fellowship” of the
temple and thus was a protected accessory use for state zoning exception).
 144. BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 7:28.
 145. Id.
 146. Saxer, supra note 131, at 593. 




















       
    
   
   
      
  
     





    
  
   
 
  
2020] DEFINING “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE” 1377
Courts have determined that for an accessory use to qualify as
religious exercise, the nature of the use need not necessarily be
religious in and of itself,147 but it must either be integrally connected to
or support the principal religious land use, without amounting to a
principal use itself.148 Another way to state this rule is that an 
“accessory use should not be subject to a primary test of whether it is a
religious use, but instead should be subject to a lesser inquiry into
whether it is reasonably necessary to accomplish the religious 
organization’s purpose . . . [and] whether a particular accessory use is 
sufficiently integral to, and within the scope of, a religious 
organization’s activities so as to be protected as a religious use.”149 As 
one court has provided, “RLUIPA requires inquiring ‘whether the 
facilities to be constructed [are] to be devoted to a religious
purpose.’ . . . [But s]uch religious purpose need not implicate ‘core 
religious practice,’ or ‘an integral part of one’s faith.’”150 Examples of 
these uses include sheltering the homeless on church property,151 
running local food pantries,152 and offering substance-abuse 
rehabilitation programs.153 
147. Land uses that are indisputably religious are usually afforded RLUIPA’s protection. See 
Galvan, supra note 28, at 208 (“Under RLUIPA, Congress wanted religious exercise to be broadly 
construed—‘to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [RLUIPA] and the Constitution.’”
(citation omitted)). But accessory uses may not be so easily categorized as such. Saxer, supra note 
131, at 615. Thus, “it is important to distinguish whether [an] accessory use is deserving of special
treatment under RLUIPA because it is a religious use [itself] or because it is accessory to a
religious [land] use.” Id.
 148. Saxer, supra note 131, at 597. In order to qualify as a true accessory use, the activity must
be “necessary and convenient” to the principal use. Id. at 594. That is, it must be “a subordinate
use, customarily incident to the principal use, and so necessary or commonly to be expected in
conjunction therewith that it cannot be supposed that an ordinance was intended to prevent it.”
Id. at 597 (quoting 83 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 168 (2003)).
 149. Id. at 615.
150. Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 734 F. Supp. 2d 409, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (first quoting
Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 190 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004); then quoting 
Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba v. Cty. of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2003); and 
then quoting Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1129 (W.D. Mich. 2005)) (alteration in original).
 151. See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574–75 (2d. 
Cir. 2002) (finding that operating a homeless shelter counts as religious exercise); Jesus Ctr. v. 
Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d 698, 703–04 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
that operating a homeless shelter was a protected accessory use under RFRA because sheltering
the needy is a customary part of the Christian tradition). 
152. See, e.g., Jirtle v. Bd. of Adjustment, Town of Biscoe, 622 S.E.2d 713, 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005). 
153. See, e.g., Men of Destiny Ministries, Inc. v. Osceola Cty., No. 6:06-cv-624, 2006 WL
3219321, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006). 
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It does not matter that these activities are not within the scope of
traditionally recognized formal worship uses.154 As one court stated,
“many religions offer services beyond traditional worship services as 
part of their religious offerings. . . . [T]he fact the [plaintiff’s] activities 
exceed its worship services makes them no less a part of Plaintiff’s 
religious exercise.”155 Accordingly, appellate courts have repeatedly 
found that providing charitable and social welfare services—like 
feeding, housing, and clothing the needy—is legitimate religious 
exercise.156 For example, when the church organization “World 
Outreach” was prevented from occupying a community center for use 
as a recreational facility to house charitable activities in a poor area of 
Chicago’s south side, its activities were protected under RLUIPA, even
though the “building is not a church as such.”157 In an opinion by Judge
Posner, the Seventh Circuit reasoned: “[T]here is no doubt that even 
the recreational and other nonreligious services provided at the 
community center are integral to the World Outreach’s religious 
mission . . . Souls aren’t saved just in church buildings.”158 
Though both types of accessory use have received accommodation 
as “religious exercise” in many RLUIPA cases,159 broad construction
of that term has not been consistent, and lower court decisions often 
contradict one another.160 For example, several courts have held that 
recreational facilities owned and operated by religious entities qualify
154. See Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 701 (E.D. Mich.
2004) (noting that the “acts themselves” need not be “religious in nature”).
 155. Id. 
156. See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 293 F.3d at 575 (observing that allowing
homeless persons to sleep outside a church at night would likely constitute religious exercise).
157. World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2009).
 158. Id.
 159. See, e.g., Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 734 F. Supp. 2d 409, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(holding that a proposed facility that included offices, library, kitchen, classrooms, and a 
gymnasium constituted religious exercise); Episcopal Student Found., 341 F. Supp. 2d at 693, 701 
(finding that a religiously affiliated student organization, which sponsored social events to provide 
students with an alternative to the usual college “party scene,” was exercising its religion). 
160. Pesick, supra note 86, at 361 (“[C]ourts have not followed a consistent framework in
interpreting religious exercise . . . .”). Compare Men of Destiny Ministries, Inc. v. Osceola Cty., 
No. 6:06-cv-624, 2006 WL 3219321, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) (holding that a religiously 
affiliated men’s substance abuse program counts as religious exercise), with Glenside Ctr., Inc. v. 
Abington Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 973 A.2d 10, 17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (holding that
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings are not religious exercise, despite the fact that the program
relies on appeals to a recognition of a higher power, because the purpose of the meetings is to
combat addiction and not to promote a religious message).
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for accommodation,161 but other courts have held the opposite, finding 
that certain facilities do not primarily serve, or are not reasonably 
necessary to serve, a religious purpose. The operation of a commercial
fitness center162 and hosting a daycare for children with mental and 
emotional disabilities163 have also been excluded from protection in 
certain instances. Even if the entity claiming protection was itself 
religious, the specific activity or land use was too minimally connected 
to the religious purpose of the organization to count as religious 
exercise. 
Despite divergent opinions, a general principle about religious 
exercise can be derived from these lower court holdings. When 
determining if an accessory use qualifies as religious exercise, courts 
generally find either that the activity itself is religious in nature—that 
it has “intelligible value only as a religious activity,”164 such as a facility 
used primarily for traditional worship, prayer, or sacramental rites like 
communion and wedding ceremonies—or that it is an accessory use— 
an activity that either is incidental and necessary to the organization’s 
religious operations, such as a parking lot, or supports a religious 
purpose or mission,165 such as a church-operated soup kitchen.
The problem with the current analysis is that it ascribes protection 
based on the religious purpose or nature of the use—which is a 
troublingly subjective inquiry. Focusing on the religious purpose the 
activity serves, lower courts often assess whether there is “a purpose 
that objective observers generally take to be religious in nature.”166 
Even the judgment in World Outreach, a case that interpreted the 
scope of RLUIPA’s protection broadly, depended on the judge asking 
whether the charitable activities were sufficiently connected to the 
161. See, e.g., Fortress Bible Church, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 501 (holding that a proposed facility 
that included a gymnasium constituted religious exercise); see also Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield
Cty., Inc. v. Borough of Litchfield, 796 F. Supp. 2d 333, 343 (D. Conn. 2011) (denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss and rejecting the claim that the refusal to allow a Jewish Orthodox group
permission to expand its meeting location would not be a substantial burden on religious
exercise), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 768 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014).
162. New Life Worship Ctr. v. Town of Smithfield Zoning Bd. of Review, C.A. No. 09–0924,
slip op. at 25 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 7, 2010) (holding that commercial fitness center and dance
facility that was open to the public but was located in a religious high school does not qualify as 
part of the high school’s religious exercise).
163. Calvary Christian Ctr. v. City of Fredericksburg, 832 F. Supp. 2d 635, 642 (E.D. Va. 2011).
 164. MacLeod, supra note 130, at 53. 
165. Id. (suggesting that an activity that has “intelligible value in service to ends that are not
exclusively religious . . . can be a religious exercise only if performed for what is generally
understood to be a religious purpose”).
 166. MacLeod, supra note 130, at 50. 
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religious mission of the church to be included.167 The language of many
other cases suggests that judicial inquiry into the connection of an
activity to a religious purpose or mission is a regular occurrence.168 
Though incidental accessory uses, like parking lots, are usually 
protected, other land uses—both accessory and not—are placed under 
increased judicial scrutiny that requires judges to decide whether a 
subordinate use sufficiently supports a principal religious purpose.169 If
the use is not subordinate, the court must determine whether it 
nonetheless can be considered “religious” in its own right.170 
Additionally, it is clear from these decisions that merely because 
an organization is religious does not mean that every action it takes will
be considered religious exercise. The existing analysis thus implicates 
the issue of whether there is a meaningful distinction between a 
religious organization’s status and its conduct. The next Part critiques 
this distinction, arguing that rather than accepting the adherent’s 
sincerity as the defining factor for what ought to count as religious 
exercise, the current analysis wrongfully requires courts to inquire into 
the degree to which the land use supports the organization’s religious 
purpose—an inquiry that inevitably asks courts to wade into the murky 
territory of deciding what is and is not required by a religious
claimant’s belief system. 
III. CONSTRUCTING A NEW DEFINITION OF “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE”
This Part argues that courts make a mistake when they distinguish 
between status and conduct, as if the two are distinct elements that bear
167. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
 168. See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574–75 (2d. 
Cir. 2002) (reasoning that sheltering the homeless “forms an integral part of [the church’s]
religious mission . . . to care for the least, the lost, and the lonely of this world. . . . There is perhaps
no higher act of worship for a Christian.”(quotations omitted)); see also supra notes 151, 159–60 
and accompanying text.
 169. Saxer, supra note 131, at 617 (“[A]ccessory uses that were not considered customary and 
incidental to the traditional house of worship were evaluated with regard to the religious tenets
of the permitted religious use.”); see also Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d
338, 348 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Courts ought to consider whether the proposed facilities were for
a religious purpose rather than simply whether the [organization] was religiously-affiliated.”); 
Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding
that although not every building will be protected under RLUIPA, a parish center that was
integral to the church’s religious mission was a permitted accessory use). 
170. MacLeod, supra note 130, at 52; see also Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 734 F. Supp. 2d
409, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“RLUIPA requires inquiring ‘whether the facilities to be constructed
[are] to be devoted to a religious purpose.” (alteration in original) (quoting Westchester Day Sch.
v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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no relation to one another.171 Rather than view status and conduct as 
distinct aspects of religious beliefs that can be separated, this Part
posits that any time a religious entity acts upon its religious conscience
and convictions, those actions are an extension of religious belief and
are thus deserving of protection under RLUIPA as “faith in action.” 
To that end, courts should adopt a refined definition of “religious 
exercise” under RLUIPA that encompasses any sincere act of religious
exercise but that excludes fraudulent, insincere claims meant only to 
circumvent legitimate zoning ordinances.  
A. Articulating a Limiting Principle 
As has been articulated, the current analysis of “religious 
exercise” under RLUIPA offers protection to land uses that support— 
but are subordinate and incidental to—the principal worship use. 
However, it excludes from protection seemingly “secular” land uses 
that are not subordinate or incidental but rather amount to a principal 
use themselves. In some cases, this “secular” use may not even 
obviously appear to support a religious purpose. Hand of Hope’s 
medical services provide an example. Hand of Hope’s medical services 
were labeled “secular” rather than “religious”172—as if the two are
mutually exclusive173—and thus the defendant questioned whether 
they deserved accommodation.174 
171. Cf. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2026 (2017)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“I don’t see why it should matter whether we describe [the] benefit, 
say, as closed to Lutherans (status) or closed to people who do Lutheran things (use). It is free
exercise either way.”).
 172. See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 14, at 16 (“‘[R]eligious exercise’ does not 
encompass activities—even well-intentioned ones—that extend beyond the core missions of a
church and are commonly performed by secular entities.”). 
173. See SMITH, supra note 31, at 129 (describing the secular as “a comprehensive view of life 
and the world—a view in which the ‘spiritual’ or the ‘holy’ or ‘supernatural’ are denied,
subordinated, or at least reduced to this-worldly terms”). The idea that the religious and the 
secular are diametrically opposed harkens to the strict “wall of separation” metaphor, usually 
attributed to Thomas Jefferson, used to describe the separation of church and state. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), https://www.loc.gov/ 
loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html [perma.cc/6LZA-RWJL] (“I contemplate with sovereign reverence 
that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a
wall of separation between Church & State.”).
 174. See Thomas C. Berg, Partly Acculturated Religious Activity: A Case for Accommodating
Religious Non-Profits, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1341, 1348 (2016) (“[C]ritics of accommodation 
[in these cases] argue that once an organization reaches out to—and thereby affects—others, it
must follow every government rule no matter how great a burden the rule imposes on religion.”).
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Religious entities that refuse to restrict their activities to the 
private realm and instead “reach out to provide services to the broader 
public” tend to provoke “controversy.”175 One author has observed 
that religious groups that “straddle the perceived boundary of the 
public versus private,” involving themselves in activities which seem
“secular” but are in fact the product of religious commitments, lead to
“[m]any of today’s most vexing problems concerning the
accommodation of religious conscience.”176 In fact, some have argued 
that “it is plainly improper to make any accommodation for religious 
freedom” once an organization involves itself in the public realm.177 
Thus, where a religious organization acts in the public realm, some
might be inclined to call that action “secular” because of the hesitancy 
to accept religious involvement in this space as legitimate.178 This is not
surprising since ideology of secularism is “reductive”—it “means 
basically, ‘not religious.’”179 But attempts to distinguish the “secular”
actions of the religious person from her “religious” motivations must 
fail if it is true that “in some measure, at least, it is [her] own moral and 
religious perspective that leads [her] to articulate the ethic of the
citizen in a liberal democracy as [she] do[es]. . . . [W]e cannot leap out
of our perspectives.”180 Although the public–private divide is strongly
rooted in our modern cultural mindset,181 it is a fallacy to assume that 
175. Id. at 1341. 
176. Id. When a religious adherent engages his convictions and beliefs and manifests them as
action in his daily life, the point at which “religion” ends and “politics” begins is not so clear.
Indeed, the two often overlap and blur into one another. See Michael W. McConnell, Believers as
Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES supra note 51, at 90, 94 (“[The very boundary 
between sacred and secular is a point of contention on which persons of various religious and
secular persuasions will inevitably disagree.”).
 177. Berg, supra note 174, at 1342.
 178. McConnell, supra note 176, at 100 (arguing that the ideology of secularism allows
“[r]eligious exercise [to be] protected, so long as it is confined to the private sphere of home and 
church” and that “[t]he assumption underlying this model is that the secular public philosophy of
the society is ‘neutral’ toward religion”).
 179. SMITH, supra note 31, at 129–30. Interestingly, the idea that the two spheres of private
belief and public action should be completely separate is a relatively modern viewpoint. Id. at 
114. Historically, “‘[t]he secular’ was, in fact, originally a religious concept, a product of traditional
religious epistemological frameworks. The concept of the secular always served the function of
distinguishing religious from nonreligious domains. But nonreligious domains did not, in the
premodern view, exist outside the religious epistemological framework.” Id. (citation omitted). 
180. Nicholas Wolterstorff, The Role of Religion in Political Issues, in RELIGION IN THE
PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE 113 
(Robert Audi & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds., 1997) (emphasis omitted). 
181. Peñ alver, supra note 39, at 813 (“In its current form, the word ‘religion’ suggests a strong 
distinction between the domain of religion and the domain of the secular.”).
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the actions of a religious adherent are somehow bracketed off from her 
religious convictions when she acts in seemingly “secular” ways.182 In 
effect, the current approach of defining accessory uses according only 
to the subordinate support they provide to recognized religious
purposes—in other words, formal worship uses—relies on a false 
dichotomy between status and conduct and risks erroneously excluding 
principal land uses that seem secular in nature but actually bear witness 
to the religious adherent’s system of belief, albeit in nontraditional 
ways. 
Further, this approach, which asks whether or not a use supports 
a religious purpose, mistakenly requires courts to inquire beyond
sincerity into the centrality of a belief and its connection to the 
proposed land use. Both the Supreme Court183 and Congress184 have
expressly rejected the notion that courts should question the 
uniformity, centrality, or consistency of belief systems.185 As then-
Judge Gorsuch opined, “judges are hardly fit arbiters of the world’s 
religions.”186 The particular tenets of religious faith are not a matter for 
judicial examination. “Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that
ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters 
of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria.”187 
Thus, courts should get out of the business of assessing what role land 
uses play in the wider religious purpose and instead largely defer to the
adherent’s claim that the desired use is an extension of religious 
182. Consider a religious organization’s advocacy on political issues that it sincerely believes
implicate its values and beliefs. For example, religious groups could support the living wage 
campaign, provide asylum for refugees, and advocate for “dying with dignity” laws and
compassionate immigration policies.
 183. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s opinion that judges should 
not “question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith”).
184. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54–55 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Under this standard, it isn’t 
for judges to decide whether a claimant who seeks to pursue a particular religious exercise has
‘correctly perceived the commands of [his] faith’ or to become ‘arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981))); see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
714–15 (1976) (“Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached
and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective
criteria.” (footnote omitted)). 
185. See Soifer, supra note 74, at 27 (arguing that courts that question the centrality of an
action or belief to the actor’s religion are likely to count as religious only that which the majority 
accepts as appropriate religious activity).
 186. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54. 
187. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714–15. 
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beliefs.188 As long as that claim and those beliefs are sincere, then the
use should qualify as religious exercise.189 Under this proposal, 
RLUIPA would support a definition of “religious exercise” that 
includes both actions that are necessary and incidental to
accomplishment of the principal land use and actions that are
extensions of the actor’s sincere religious beliefs, regardless of whether 
the actions are subordinate or constitute the principal land use itself. 
This proposal recognizes that a religious entity may sometimes act 
in ways that are not derived from its religious beliefs; that is, a religious 
organization may use its land for certain purposes that have no
connection at all to its religious viewpoint. Accordingly, some activities 
of a religious organization are so unrelated to the religious mission that
they cannot qualify as religious exercise. To claim the contrary would 
be to interpret RLUIPA so expansively as to include every single
action taken by a religious entity regardless of its bearing on or
connection to its belief system, opening the floodgates to religious-
land-use litigation.190 Therefore, it is not suggested here that religious 
entities should receive a carte blanche for any and all activities 
performed that have absolutely no connection to that entity’s religious 
belief.191 Although this may seem difficult to reconcile with the above
188. Sometimes courts seem to conflate the religious exercise and substantial burden 
questions and allow the degree of impact that a law has on a given activity, or the existence of 
similar alternatives to that activity, to weigh on the determination of whether or not that activity
is in fact “religious exercise.” See Ridley Park United Methodist Church v. Zoning Hearing Bd.
Ridley Park Borough, 920 A.2d 953, 960 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (determining that denying the 
church permission to host daycare had a de minimis impact on the church’s opportunity to engage
in religious activities because the church’s other activities like Sunday school, regular church
services, and counseling all provided opportunity for religious instruction).
 189. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction: Pluralism, Integralism, and Political Theories of
Religious Accommodation, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH:
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 3, 27 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
2000) (arguing that courts should not doubt an adherent’s claim that his actions are rooted in
sincere religious beliefs, unless these beliefs pose a “manifest danger to the state”).
 190. See, e.g., Evans-Cowley & Pearlman, supra note 28, at 208 (noting that lawsuits
concerning the non-worship activities of megachurches are proliferating); Galvan, supra note 28, 
at 209–10 (“RLUIPA could help [a] megachurch avoid complying with zoning codes, city planning
goals, historic preservation ordinances, traffic requirements, and aesthetic regulations—resulting
in a greater impact on neighborhoods and towns than the law’s framers might have envisioned.”).
191. Several scholars have debunked the concern that RLUIPA’s substantial burden
provision, including the interpretation of the term “religious exercise,” would be dangerously
overbroad. Rather, courts have uniformly adopted a narrow interpretation of the provision—in
some cases, perhaps too narrowly—such that two commentators have called RLUIPA “under
enforced.” Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-
Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1021, 1048 (2012); see also id. at 1025 (finding that “RLUIPA
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discussion, it is possible to argue that not every action taken by a 
religious entity is religious exercise and at the same time recognize that
many actions that do not look religious on their face, or that could
equally be performed by a secular organization, are in fact direct 
extensions of the beliefs of the organization. Of course, accepting these 
two arguments as consistent requires a level of confidence that 
organizations will neither bring fraudulent claims based on insincere
belief in order to circumvent zoning regulations nor assert exemptions 
for land uses that have no connection at all to its belief system.  
Admittedly, this principle does require a minimal level of inquiry 
not only into the sincerity of the adherent’s claim but also into the 
threshold question of whether the activity is related to a religious belief 
at all. Still, this minimal inquiry into the substance of the belief pales in 
comparison to the current RLUIPA analysis, which tasks judges with 
determining what is and is not conduct mandated by a claimant’s 
religious beliefs. There will, of course, be difficult cases when a
religious organization acts in a way that it views as an extension of its 
sincere beliefs, but to the outside observer, the action seems unrelated 
to the religion at all. For example, as Justice Gorsuch proposes, to ask 
whether a religious man says grace before dinner or whether a man 
begins his meal in a religious manner rests upon a false dichotomy
between status and conduct.192 Surely, a religious man’s activity of 
prayer follows from his inner belief in a relationship with a higher 
power. But it may be necessary to ask whether the religious man’s act 
of brushing his teeth is an extension of his religious beliefs or whether 
this conduct carries no religious meaning despite his having internal 
religious convictions.193 
To summarize, for a land use to count as “religious exercise” 
under RLUIPA, an entity’s actions must (1) constitute a formal 
worship use; (2) qualify as a traditionally recognized “accessory use,” 
one that is subordinate, necessary, and customarily incidental to the
property’s principal use; or (3) amount to an extension of the religious
entity’s sincere religious belief, regardless of whether it is subordinate 
does not give churches carte blanche to ignore zoning regulations” and is needed to combat
religious discrimination in the land use context).
192. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025–26 (2017)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). 
193. See Miller, supra note 51, at 879 (“Many claims are so clearly secular that they are often 
dismissed through common sense reasoning. For example, the government does not establish a
religion of ‘nuclearism’ simply by promoting pronuclear policies or seeking to protect nuclear
armaments from vandalism.” (footnote omitted)).
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to the principal use. Importantly, land uses that have a negligible 
connection to the entity’s religious beliefs will be excluded from
protection. And of course, “sham” belief systems fraudulently invoked
to avoid zoning regulations will not be recognized.194 Additional 
examples of actions that would fall outside the scope of the new
definition might include, for example, a church’s Fourth of July
fireworks celebration that violates a local noise ordinance, an attempt 
to build a chapel tower that exceeds a height restriction, or the 
installation of purely aesthetic landscaping.195 As is likely apparent at
this point, the line is a thin one, and in many cases, it will be necessary
to put trust in the honesty of religious organizations to avoid insincere
claims and in judges to abstain from making improper value judgments 
about religious beliefs. Ultimately, this proposal seeks a balance 
between the broad protections that Congress intended when it enacted 
in RLUIPA and the recognition that fraudulent claims must be
excluded from protection to avoid a flood of frivolous litigation. 
B. Applying the Principle: Hand of Hope 
It is instructive to return to the introductory case study and apply 
the proposed limiting principle to Hand of Hope’s provision of medical 
services to pregnant women.196 Recall from the above discussion that 
traditional accessory uses must be both “necessary and convenient” to
a religious institution’s principal land use and also “subordinate” and
“incidental” to that use.197 Hand of Hope’s services do not fit within
194. For example, a college fraternity once sought a religious exemption from a maximum
occupancy law by rejecting the label of “fraternity,” calling themselves instead, “the Apostles of
Peace and Unity.” Michelle Boorstein, ‘Apostles’ Ordered To Abide by Zoning Laws, WASH.
POST (Nov. 23, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/22/ 
AR2006112201924.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/NPQ2-9U2F]. 
195. Harder cases that still might not meet the test include a megachurch’s operation of a
multipurpose facility that houses sports events, an organization’s on site coffee shop whose 
proceeds support a religious charity, the construction of a pool open for a fee to public use, and
other similar commercial enterprises. See 146 CONG. REC. 16,700 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch
& Kennedy) (“[A] burden on a commercial building, which is connected to religious exercise
primarily by the fact that the proceeds from the building’s operation would be used to support
religious exercise, is not a substantial burden on ‘religious exercise.’”); see also Scottish Rite 
Cathedral Ass’n of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 216 (Cal. App. 2007)
(“[A] burden on a commercial enterprise used to fund a religious organization does not constitute
a substantial burden on ‘religious exercise’ within the meaning of RLUIPA.”).
 196. See supra Introduction (explaining Hand of Hope’s services).
 197. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (explaining that an accessory land use must
be both “necessary and convenient” and “subordinate and customarily incidental” to the principal
land use).
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this definition of an “accessory” use because they are not 
“subordinate” or “incidental” to the organization’s principal purpose. 
Nor are Hand of Hope’s medical services necessary for the use and 
enjoyment of the property in the way that a parking lot is. But the
Center’s services are also not like the homeless shelter, which 
obviously supports a religious mission but still remains subordinate and
secondary to the principal land use. Instead, Hand of Hope’s medical 
services amount to the principal land use themselves.198 As primarily a 
pregnancy resource center, it would be difficult to argue that these 
services are merely accessory to a principal land use. Because its land 
use is not protected as a traditional accessory use, or even a 
subordinate one that supports a religious purpose, the question thus 
arises whether Hand of Hope’s activity qualifies as an intelligible 
extension of its sincere religious beliefs. 
Deferring to Hand of Hope’s own view of the relation of its
services to its religious mission,199 it is clear that these medical services 
do not merely support religious belief; they are integrally related to the 
religious mission of the nonprofit. Indeed, the provision of these 
services constitutes that mission itself, such that they should be 
recognized as sincere extensions of Hand of Hope’s Christian 
convictions and should qualify as religious exercise. 
Ultrasounds and medical services are of course not on their face 
“religious.” A nonreligious, secular entity could perform these services 
for any number of reasons, not all of which will be influenced by any 
religious beliefs, moral values, or even ethical guidelines.200 For 
example, it may be that a hospital provides these services simply
because a patient needs them for the maintenance of her health. In
such a case, the services would of course not qualify for special 
protection under RLUIPA, RFRA, or the First Amendment.201 
198. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
 199. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing Hand of Hope’s view of all of its
services as medical). 
200. Cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339, 344 (1970) (protecting beliefs which “play
the role of a religion and function as a religion in [the believer’s] life” because they are “spurred
by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs”).
201. Relatedly, it is now the regular practice of states to exempt religiously affiliated hospitals
from providing women with abortions or other contraceptive services when the health care facility
objects on religious grounds. See generally Refusing To Provide Health Services, GUTTMACHER 
INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/refusing-provide-health-services [https://perma.cc/ 
MTX8-LU74] (“Almost every state has adopted similar policies related to abortion, and, in many
instances, policies regarding sterilization or other contraceptive services . . . .”). The Supreme
Court decided that commercial, for-profit entities also had a valid exemption from providing 
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However, when a religious entity performs these services, the 
inextricable connection between the religious character of the 
nonprofit and the actions that are motivated by its character cannot be 
devalued or forgotten.202 For example, a nonreligious charity could 
operate a homeless shelter out of moral convictions or as a civic good
to improve the community. A similar shelter, however, might 
constitute a church’s religious exercise if it can be shown to be an 
extension of the church’s religious tenets of charity, neighbor love, and
the common good. By the same token, medical services, which are not 
prima facie religious, take on a religious character when performed by 
a religious entity that sincerely believes that those services will not only 
advance its religious mission and calling but are also integral to them.203 
Hand of Hope, as a Christian nonprofit, seeks to spread its 
understanding of the gospel by reaching out to and providing medical 
services to expecting women.204 In doing so, Hand of Hope also seeks 
to effect a particular outcome: that after seeing the ultrasound images, 
these women will choose not to have an abortion.205 Despite not 
contraceptives to female employees, as was required by the Affordable Care Act, if the owners
of the entity had a religious objection to doing so. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682 (2014).
202. These conflicts and problems are likely to continue in the current context of political
participation as church leaders and prominent political theologians advocate for symbiosis
between religious values and the potential for fruitful church participation in the contemporary
context. See e.g., LUKE BRETHERTON, CHRISTIANITY AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS: THE 
CONDITIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF FAITHFUL WITNESS 220 (2010) (arguing that there can be
mutual support between the obligations of citizenship and demands of faith, a relationship
wherein the “congregation and the demos are echoes of each other,” partners in pursuit of the
common good and a politics that is faithful and just); Cornel West, The Crisis of Christian Identity 
in America, in THE ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS 293, 304 (J. Caleb Clanton ed., 2009) (warning that if society holds onto the myopic
view of personal motivations for political participation, it may “fail[] to appreciate the moral
progress, political breakthroughs, and spiritual freedoms forged by the heroic efforts of modern
citizens of religious and secular traditions”); see also LUKE BRETHERTON, CHRIST AND THE 
COMMON LIFE: POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY 38 (2019) (“Political
theology refuses this separation [between moral and religious questions and political and
economic ones], seeing political and economic judgments as always already moral judgments and
political life as inherently sacred and secular.”). 
203. Cf. Paul Marshall, Politicizing Religion, HUDSON INST. (May 27, 2019), 
https://www.hudson.org/research/14598-politicizing-religion [https://perma.cc/W99H-3A5S]
(“Religion nearly always affects politics . . . by shaping hearts and minds, hopes and dreams. Our
ultimate faiths and beliefs influence our views of history, justice, law, mercy, power, human 
nature, and evil.”). 
204. See supra Introduction (noting various ways that Hand of Hope explains its mission and 
services). 
205. Hand of Hope purchased this particular parcel of land because of its location neighboring
an abortion clinic, Women’s Preferred Health. Hand of Hope argued that God called on them to
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looking like traditional worship activities, these “medical” uses 
constitute the principal land use of Hand of Hope’s property, are “faith 
in action,”206 and should qualify as religious exercise within the
meaning of RLUIPA.207 
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment has long been interpreted to protect not 
only the inner beliefs of a person but also the performance of those 
beliefs in the believer’s daily actions.208 And the Court has consistently
shown it is unwilling to assess critically the types of beliefs an individual
holds, determining it improper to analyze the contours of a chosen
belief system. The choice to abstain from substantive judgment is upset 
by RLUIPA, however, where the current analysis for what constitutes 
“religious exercise” allows courts to pass judgment on an individual’s 
claimed religious land use. That form of analysis is wrong not only in 
light of the Court’s own admission that it is not a fit arbiter of religious
belief and practice but also because it presumes that religious persons
locate their practice there to offer expecting mothers an accessible pro-life option. See supra note 
4 and accompanying text (“The property is adjacent to an abortion clinic . . . .”); supra note 23 
and accompanying text (“Hand of Hope views all of its services, including those that are ‘medical,’
as the ‘outreach ministry of Jesus Christ through His church.’” (quoting Complaint, supra note 9,
¶ 11)). 
206. Saxer, supra note 131. 
207. In May 2019, the District Court of North Carolina denied the City of Raleigh’s request
for summary judgment on the Hand of Hope’s RLUIPA-based “equal terms” claim (which was
not addressed in this Note). Hand of Hope Pregnancy Res. Ctr. v. City of Raleigh, 386 F. Supp.
3d 618, 628 (E.D.N.C 2019). The District Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s substantial burden claim. Id. The court dismissed the claim because it
found that Raleigh’s prohibition of the provision of pregnancy tests and ultrasound imaging did
“not amount to a substantial burden on religious exercise, even assuming the provision of
ultrasounds and pregnancy tests in this context constitutes religious exercise.” Id. at 625. As to
the plaintiff’s remaining RLUIPA claims, the parties reached a settlement at a court-hosted
settlement conference on September 27, 2019. Hand of Hope Pregnancy Res. Ctr. v. City of
Raleigh, No. 5:16-CV-00746 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2019).
 208. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“[T]he 
‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or
abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in
sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes
of transportation.”); Frederick Gedicks & Michael McConnell, Common Interpretation: The Free
Exercise Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/ 
interpretation/amendment-i/interps/265 [https://perma.cc/Q2TE-GEYT] (“In drafting the [Free 
Exercise] Clause, Congress considered several formulations, but ultimately settled on protecting
the ‘free exercise of religion.’ This phrase makes plain the protection of actions as well as beliefs,
but only those in some way connected to religion.”).
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or groups can bracket off their beliefs and convictions, such that their 
conduct can be easily labeled either religious or nonreligious. 
The true test for what constitutes a valid “religious exercise”
should instead be sincerity. When the primary land use by a religious 
entity is motivated by a sincere religious belief, that activity should 
count as “religious exercise.” It can then receive further scrutiny under 
the existing free-exercise, substantial-burden analysis. Activities that 
seem nonreligious or even secular at first glance may very well be
sincere “faith in action.” Hand of Hope surely believes that its medical 
provisions are part of its Christian ministry. As the sincere exercise of 
its religious beliefs, courts should recognize Hand of Hope’s provision 
of pregnancy services as religious exercise. Sincerity alone as the 
defining criterion of “religious exercise” most properly allows religious 
entities to claim RLUIPA protection for more than just traditional and 
obvious religious uses. It appropriately recognizes that some land uses, 
though not ostensibly religious, are nonetheless inspired by sincere 
religious belief and deserve protection as “faith in action.” After all, as 
Judge Posner wrote, “[s]ouls aren’t saved just in church buildings.”209 
209. World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2009).
